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I. Lessons from the NAFTA Debate
There are two major lessons concerning democratizing that can be
learned from the NAFTA 1 debate. First, the lack of democratic participa-
tion in the drafting of the agreement led to major problems. Second, the
intense public debate that ensued after the conclusion of the original
agreement brought out a wide range of new and important issues and con-
cerns, ultimately making the agreement more environmentally sound and
politically acceptable.
The lack of democratic participation in the drafting of the NAFTA led
to two significant problems. First, the public lacked an in-depth under-
standing of the key issues and effective solutions. The Clinton Administra-
tion "shut out" individuals and groups, including some of the most
knowledgeable and thoughtful, who criticized the direction of the NAFTA
negotiations.2 Major problems in several areas of the agreement, includ-
ing environmental, 3 food safety,4 and agricultural5 issues, could have been
avoided if the process had been more open to participation.
* Director, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
Advanced Degree Candidate, International Public Law, University of Amsterdam; B.S.,
Iowa State University, 1971.
1. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., 32
I.L.M. 296 and 32 I.L.M. 605 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. See Letter from Citizens Trade Campaign to Ambassador Michael Kantor (Sept.
12, 1993) (on file with Citizens Trade Campaign and author).
3. Eric Christensen & Rodney E. Leonard, Community Nutrition Inst., Brief of
Community Nutrition Institute Concerning Negotiation of a North American Free
Trade Agreement (Aug. 12, 1991).
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The second major problem created by shutting out the public was the
resulting lack of public support. The huge political battle over the NAFTA
in Congress, which cost taxpayers billions of dollars in "sweeteners"8 and
created huge political splits in the environmental community,7 could have
been avoided if there was a serious attempt to include public participation.
Similarly, there was little public input into the proposed treaty on
biodiversity that came out of the Rio Summit.8 Because there was little
public participation in the negotiation process, there was little public sup-
port for this important treaty, which made it very difficult to build political
momentum necessary for congressional ratification. Citizens must feel
like they are a part of the negotiating process if they are ever going to
make the kinds of lifestyle and workplace changes needed to implement
this and other treaties. Unless citizens feel like they are a part of the pro-
cess, they are unlikely to ever agree to drive their cars less or to be more
energy conscious in their daily lives.
Largely because of the strong organizing done by groups who both
opposed and supported the final text of the NAFMA, the democratic pro-
cess was very lively and active once the agreement was completed. The
lessons learned as a result of this intense debate can be grouped into two
main categories: scientific and political.
Scientific Lessons:
a) Environmental concerns related to trade (imports and exports)
b) Environmental concerns related to trade agreements and negotiations
and their relations to international environmental agreements
Political Lessons:
a) Political dynamics of trade (imports and exports)
b) Political dynamics of trade agreements and their relations to other
international agreements
c) Political dynamics of trade negotiations
d) Coalition building/conflict creation within environmental, animal wel-
fare and consumer community (conscious and inadvertent)
e) Coalition building/conflict creation beyond the environmental com-
munity
f) Coalition building/conflict creation across borders
4. PuBuc CmZEN, THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRAmn AGR.EEMENT: A DETAiLED
ANALisis OF SANrrARY AND PH'rosANrrARY STANDARDS (1992) (adaption for Pesticide
Action Network October 1992 meeting).
5. Mark Ritchie, Free Trade Versus Sustainable Agriculture: The Implications of NAFTA,
22 EcOLOOIST 221 (1992).
6. Mark Dowie, The Selling (Out) of the Greens, 258 NAmoN 514 (1994).
7. NAFTA: Family Fued [sic] Splinters Greens, Greenwire, American Political Network
Inc., Sept. 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Keith Schneider,
Environment Groups Are Split on Support for Free Trade Pact N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1993, at
Al.
8. Rio Declaration on Environment and DevelopmentJune 14, 1992, Principle 15,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 151/5/Rev.1 (1992), 31 I.L.M. 876 (1992).
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II. Applying These Lessons to the GATT Debate
Given that the GATr negotiations ended, it is too late to try to change the
negotiation procedure to include more public participation. Unfortu-
nately, the process was even more closed than that of the NAFTCA, result-
ing in a final GATT text9 with numerous serious environmental and
political problems.
Negotiators ignored the repeated calls by environmental groups for
some elementary changes. For example, in a December 1, 1993 letter to
the U.S. Trade Representative, several major Washington, D.C.-based envi-
ronmental organizations made a number of technical suggestions for
changes in the text and called for "measures to ensure greater public par-
ticipation and transparency in the GAIT dispute settlement proce-
dures."' 0 The requested changes were ignored.
Even some staff from the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and
other departments expressed their disappointment about how little got
"fixed" in the final deal." For example, the final language does not incor-
porate even the relatively weak language used in the NAFTA on a key issue
such as burden of proof in environmental disputes.12 The final Uruguay
Round language requires only that the Member against whom the com-
plaint has been brought rebut the charge. 13 Even the six Washington,
D.C.-based conservation groups who backed the NAFTA publicly attacked
the final GAIT deal. 14
Instead of allowing more openness and democratic procedures, the
Uruguay Round moved in the opposite direction, creating a new World
Trade Organization (WTO)15 with greatly expanded powers but no dis-
cemible expansion in mechanisms for public participation.
9. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotia-
tions [hereinafter Uruguay Round], GATT Doc. MTN/FA (Dec. 15, 1993), 33 I.L.M. 9
(1994), reprinted in OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATrVE, FINAL ACT EMBODYING
THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS (VERSION
OF 15 DECEMBER 1993) (1993).
10. Letter from Community Nutrition Institute to U.S. Trade Representative (Dec.
1, 1993) (signed by several environmental organizations).
11. Private discussion with Environmental Protection Agency Staff (Dec. 1993).
12. See, e.g., GATT Dispute Settlemen4 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2005.
13. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, GATT
Doc. MTN/FA II-A2, § 3.8 (Dec. 15, 1993), in Uruguay Round, supra note 9. See generally
Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Dispute Settlement GATT Facts (Inst. for Agric. & Trade Pol'y, Min-
neapolis, Minn. [undated]).
14. The National Audubon Society, the National Wildlife Federation, the Natural
Resources Defense Council, the Environmental Defense Fund, the World Wildlife
Fund, and Conservation International were the only major environmental groups to
support NAFTA. See Schneider, supra note 7. However, most of these same groups
recently voiced their objections to the GATT. See GATT: Coalition of Environmental
Groups Announces Opposition to Implementing Bill, BNA Nat'l Env't Daily, Sept. 30,
1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File; Environmental Groups Unite Against
Trade Bill Before Congress, U.S. Newswire, Sept. 29, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
15. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral [World] Trade Organization (WTO), GATT
Doc. MTN/FA II (Dec. 15, 1993), in Uruguay Round, supra note 9.
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M. Next Steps
Given the lack of any democratic participation in the negotiation process,
the final result is both seriously flawed and lacks public political support.
While it may be possible to pass this agreement through Congress using
the "fast track" procedures, 16 the agreement is a long way from being envi-
ronmentally acceptable. Therefore it invites disregard and disrespect
whether or not it becomes U.S. law. In order to correct the environmental
problems and to build public support, there must be a major public
debate, like the debate that surrounded the NAFTA. Based on what was
learned from the NAFIA, the following steps would be necessary in any
"Greening of the GAT" campaign.
1. There must be careful and thorough analysis of the potential
impacts of this GATT text on every conceivable environmental topic. The
list of topics developed by the Clinton Administration for immediate atten-
tion is a good starting place: Agriculture, Services, Environmental Tech-
nologies and Services, Transportation, Energy, Advanced Materials and
Non-Renewable Resources, Wildlife and-Fisheries, and Forest Resources.
2. There must be drafting of specific language changes for the GATT
text. This process must include thorough and careful consultation with
the broad, international coalition of concerned groups that has been con-
structed as part of the overall trade debate over the past few years.
3. Once the deal is signed, there must be a second round of analysis,
with an eye towards drafting specific legal language for the enabling legis-
lation that could mitigate the worst elements. These ideas would then be
backed by a grassroots campaign targeting Congress.
4. There must be a use of the GATT working group on trade and
environment to develop and promote a series of positive and new ideas for
a proactive response (instead of just reactions against the current bad
agreement).
IV. Beyond the GATT: Building upon the International Network
While the GATT is the next item on the Clinton Administration's trade
agenda, it is only one in a series of planned steps. President Clinton has
already sent his trade negotiators to Chile, Central America, and other
countries in Latin America to prepare the way to extend the NAFTA to the
rest of the Western Hemisphere. 17 These new agreements could possibly
be the testing grounds and pilot projects for serious attempts to democra-
tize the negotiating process.
Efforts must be made inside all involved countries to change the
negotiating process. Without agreement from all governments involved, it
will be difficult to get the United States to be more forthcoming. There
are many areas where the expertise of non-governmental and citizen-orga-
16. Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2495, 2191 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
17. Peter Behr, White House Roats Trade Talks Plan: U.S. Wants Chile, Others Under
NAFTA, WASH. PosT, June 17, 1994, at Fl; Leon Hadar, A Case of "Trade Exhaustion" in
Washington, Bus. TimEs, July 14, 1994, at 13.
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nizations could make a significant positive contribution to the negotiating
process: sustainable agriculture, energy, compensatory financing mecha-
nisms, packaging, labeling and waste, technology transfer, intellectual
property rights, sustainable forestry, biotechnology and biodiversity, and
global governance and policy-making.
V. Democratizing the Globalization Process
Beyond the narrowly defined trade agenda (the GATT, the NAFTA, etc.)
there is a much broader agenda, one that goes beyond free trade, which is
called globalization. There are a number of elements to this agenda,
including the push to extend the NAFTA to all of Latin America and plans
for integrating with Asia through the APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Coop-
eration). All of these elements must be carefully constructed in order to
include substantive procedures for democratic participation. Key issues to
which citizens' groups could contribute include: sorting out the some-
times conflicting aspects of free trade,jobs and the environment, develop-
ing a positive agenda aimed at the development of sustainable trade
policies, articulating alternative approaches to the global decision-making
processes, being proactive and building bottom-up economic initiatives,
assembling the broad political coalitions needed to adopt and implement
global policies, and organizing basic education and outreach to the media.
VI. Beyond Trade: The Need for a Sustainable Livelihoods Initiative
Beyond the narrow confines of trade policy debates lies fertile ground for
expanding public participation in economic policy. A good example is
the question of jobs and sustainable employment. Both the NAFTA and
the GATT debates have hinged largely on two issues-jobs and the envi-
ronment. The Administration has argued that the best way to address
environmental concerns and unemployment is free trade.' 8 Although
many people do not agree with this perspective, simply arguing against it
does not, on its own, protect the environment or create jobs. With or
without the GATr there is an existing crisis in the U.S. and other
economies.
Constructing a bottom-up debate on a national sustainable liveli-
hoods initiative would shift the debate away from simple positions on a
single GAIT issue to a debate about what is the best possible way to foster
policies that will create economically and ecologically sound employment
and self-employment opportunities. For example, there are many ideas
for employment and self-employment creation in the area of energy con-
servation, including insulation, energy conserving remodeling, weatheriza-
tion, alternative fuels production, etc. 19 There are also many efforts to
reconsider lifestyle choices which affect this entire process.
18. Joe Lyford, Jr., Trade Uber Ales: The Propaganda and Politics of NAFTA and GAYT,
PROPAGANDA REv., No. 11, 1994, at 22.
19. See DAVID MORRIS, INST. FOR LOCAL SELF-RELNcE, ETHANOL: BRIrNoN ENVI-
RONMENTAL AND ECONOMIC BzEFzrrs TO MINNESOTA (1993); DAVID MORRIS & IRSHAD
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We need to bundle together all of the exciting ideas that people have
about how to foster environmentally sustainable employment and self-
employment and take these to the policy-makers in Congress, in state legis-
latures, and in local governments. State-wide or city-wide conferences
sponsored by local environmental groups are an excellent way to gather
ideas and to get other groups committed to this part of a campaign. We
could hold a national conference to gather the findings of the local and
state meetings and to assemble a package to be pushed at the national
level through grassroots organizing.
If the democratic process can be expanded beyond merely reacting to
the proposals of governments to the actual construction of positive new
ideas and solutions, then we can sustain the interest and concern of citi-
zens long enough to really engage them in a newly opened GATT process.
It would be a disaster to open up the GATT and then have few, or no,
people willing, able, and competent to engage in the debate. This kind of
positive approach can create the basis for the participation of real citizen
diplomats in this important economic arena.
AHMED, INST. FOR LOCAL SEL-RuLANcE, RuRAL DEVELOPMENT, BIoRE iNIuES AND THE
CARBOHYDRATE ECONOMY (1993).
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